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INDIAN EMPLOYMENT PREFERENCE:
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Native Americans have been increasingly active in
identifying and protecting their legal rights and resources. Much of the

development in the law has been in areas involving natural resources
such as land,I minerals,2 water,3 and hunting and fishing rights. 4 There

has also been development in the area of tribal sovereignty.Another area of imminent importance to the tribes concerns protection of their legal rights and human resources. 6 Increased economic
development on reservations, especially in the area of subsurface minerals,7 has brought about an increase in the number of non-Indians

living on, or near, reservations. This, in turn, has led to political, social,
1. See, e.g., Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st
Cir. 1975) (which held that the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976), imposed a fiduciary
role upon the United States to protect lands of a tribe covered by the Act, regardless of whether
the tribe was recognized by the federal government).
2. See, e.g., Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 289
(10th Cir. 1978) (striking down a Federal Energy Regulatory Comn'n's regulation which had
disqualified the Tribe from charging small producer rates); United States v. City of Pawhuska, 566
F.2d 1132 (10th Cir. 1977) (reversing the district court's order that upon payment of damages for
trespass, the city would be vested with fee title to tribal mineral rights).
3. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (holding that tribes are entitled to
sufficient water to supply future as well as present needs, based upon the amount of practicably
irrigable acreage on a reservation).
4. See, e.g., Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (treaties protecting the
"right of taking fish.., in common with all citizens," secure to the tribes a right to harvest an
equitable share of anadromous fish passing through tribal fishing areas). Id. at 662.
5. The concept of tribal sovereignty includes such notions as: self-determination, see Indian
Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1976); sovereign immunity, see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); as well as inherent sovereign
power, see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (tribal power to punish criminal conduct
of tribal members is a retained power and is not derived from the federal government).
6. See I AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REviw COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 347-48 (1977):
Discussions of human resources on Indian reservations invariably center around such
issues as idleness, unemployment, and welfare. Depending on whose figures are accepted, 30-70% of Indian adults are described as unemployed. And implicit in these
descriptions is both a moral judgment and a fatalistic acceptance.
But of course, the human resources question can be approached from the opposite
standpoint. The large number of people unemployed can be viewed as a positive factor.
They can be described as a large labor pool. They can be viewed as a potential resource
for development, just as minerals and timber are potential resources for development.
Id.
7. Id. at 338-39.
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and cultural problems on the reservations.8 Development of tribal
human resources will reduce the need for non-Indian labor, thus slowing the influx of non-Indians. Consequently, such development will
help to alleviate problems of Indian unemployment and poverty.
Indian employment rights, specifically those concerning employment preference for Indians on or near reservations, as well as within
those branches of the federal government directly serving Indians, are
necessary to enable tribes to protect and develop their human resources. The federal government has taken part in this development,
but Indian tribes must play the prominent role.
This paper briefly examines Indian employment preference at the
federal, state, and tribal levels. The emphasis will be on tribal employment preference laws, their legal foundations and their limitations.
Most tribes have retained the sovereign power to regulate the conduct
of employers on their reservations in order to permit implementation of
such preference ordinances. Although other legal grounds for this
power exist, inherent tribal sovereignty is the most important one. The
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)9 is potentially the greatest limitation
on the exercise of tribal sovereignty in this area. The ICRA's requirements of equal protection and due process, and the impact these requirements may have in limiting the extent to which tribal preference
ordinances may be imposed, will also be discussed.
II.
A.

FEDERAL INDIAN EMPLOYMENT PREFERENCE

Background
Employment preference for Indians has existed since 183410 and

8. Id. at 342-43.
9. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1976).
10. See 25 U.S.C. § 45 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 162, § 9, 4 Stat.
737) (employment of interpreters "or other persons employed for the benefit of the Indians").
Other general employment preference statutes were subsequently enacted: 25 U.S.C. § 46 (1976)
(originally enacted as Act of May 17, 1882, ch. 163, § 6, 22 Stat. 88, and Act of July 4, 1884, ch.
180, § 6, 23 Stat. 97) (employment of clerical, mechanical, and other help on reservations and
about agencies); 25 U.S.C. § 44 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 290, § 10,
28 Stat. 313) (employment of herders, teamsters, and laborers, "and where practicable in all other
employments" in the Indian service); 25 U.S.C. § 274 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 7,
1897, ch. 3, § 1, 30 Stat. 83) (employment as matrons, farmers, and industrial teachers in Indian
schools); 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 23, 36 Stat.
861) (general preference as to employment of Indian labor and purchase of products of Indian
industry). 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, § 12, 48
Stat. 984) (known as the Wheeler-Howard Act or the Indian Reorganization Act). See Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 541 & n.8 (1974).
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continues to comprise part of the federal government's Indian policy. I

Congress, by providing employment preferences, intended to give Indians control over their internal affairs.12 The early statutes, however,
were unsuccessful in acheiving this intent. Indians were required to

qualify under civil service standards and to compete with non-Indians.
This was a serious disadvantage when one considers that "the Indians
were denied or did not have access to education and were accorded no
and skill obtained outside of the standards
merit for the life knowledge
3

of formal education."'

The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA)' 4 was enacted to
abolish the disadvantages suffered by Indians. Section twelve of the

IRA,' 5 providing for Indian hiring preferences within the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) "without regard to civil-service laws," was intended "to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes would be able to
assume a greater degree of self-government, both politically and economically."' 6 The BIA, however, never adequately put preference into
operation. 7 For almost forty years, until the 1970's, preference was
11. Recently, the Department of the Interior promulgated regulations, pursuant to § 7(b) of
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450e(b) (1976), requiring that preferences be given to Indians in employment, training, and subcontracting under certain categories of contracts. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,510 (1979) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. §§ 14-1.354,
-7.5002 to .5003).
12. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), the United States Supreme Court noted:
The purpose of these preferences, as variously expressed in the legislative history, has
been to give Indians a greater participation in their own self-government; to further the
government's trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; and to reduce the negative effect
of having non-Indians administer matters that affect Indian tribal life.
Id. at 541-42 (footnotes omitted).
13. Funke, EducationalAssistanceand Employment Preference: Who Is An Indian;"4 AM.
IND. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1976).
14. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified in 25 U.S.C. §§ 461466, 470-471, 473-476, 478-479 (1976)).
15. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1976):
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish standards of health, age, character,
experience, knowledge, and ability for Indians who may be appointed to the various
positions maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office, in the administration of
functions or services affecting any Indian tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter
have the preference to appointment to vacancies in any such positions.
Id.
16. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974) (footnote omitted). See generally Hearings
on S2755 and S.3645 Before the Senate Comm on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2, 256
(1934) (statement by Senator Wheeler, co-sponsor of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461-466, 470-471, 473-476, 478-479 (1976); S. REp. No. 1080, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934);
7902 Before the House Comm on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1934);
Hearings on H.
78 CONG. REC. 9270 (remarks of Senator Hastings), 11,123 (remarks of Senator Wheeler), 11,727,
11,729, 11,731-32 (remarks of Representative Howard) (1934); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
541 & n.9, 543 & n.15 (1974); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Hickel, 432 F.2d 956, 960 & n.4 (10th
Cir. 1970).
17. See Freeman v. Morton, 499 F.2d 494,496 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY
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limited to initial employment and reinstatement, and was inapplicbale

to filling vacancies, making promotions, or providing for lateral transfers. This policy was changed in 1972.18 Moreover, the Department of

the Interior has recently revised its preference regulations for contracts,
subcontracts, grants, and subgrants under section seven of the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act.19
B.

Present Status

Several other statutes provide for general Indian employment
preference in such areas as health,2 0 education,21 and construction2 2
REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 244, 271 (1977); S.TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY

225-26 (1973).
18. Department of Interior News Release, June 23, 1972, "Interior Expands Policy of Indian
Preference in Bureau of Indian Affairs"; See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 538 & n.3 (1974);
Freeman v. Morton, 499 F.2d 494,496 (D.C. Cir. 1974); S.TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY
225-26 (1973). See also Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1979) (civil service
regulations governing conflicts of interest do not apply even when originally hired on a competitive basis); Tyndall v. United States, No. 77-0004 (D.C. Cir. April 22, 1977) (Indian Health Service of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare consented to be bound by the preference
statutes, 25 U.S.C. §§ 44-47, 472 (1976)).
19. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,510 (1979); See note IIsupra. See also Act of December 5, 1979, Pub. L.
No. 96-135, 93 Stat. 1056 (amending 5 U.S.C. §§ 3502, 8336, 8339 (1976)).
20. 25 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976) (providing for a health profession recruiting program for Indians
through grants to locate Indians with potential for education or training in the health professions
and to assist them in receiving the necessary education); 25 U.S.C. § 1633 (1976) (providing for
preference to Indians and Indian firms in the construction and renovation of health facilities of
the Indian Health Service). See also Act of December 5, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-135, 93 Stat. 1056
(amending 5 U.S.C. §§ 3502, 8336, 8339 (1976)).
21. 20 U.S.C. § 3385(d) (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) provides:
The Commissioner is also authorized to make grants to institutions of higher education and to State and local educational agencies, in combination with institutions of
higher eduation, for carrying out programs and projects(I) to prepare persons to serve Indian students as teachers, administrators, teacher
aides, social workers, and ancillary educational personnel; and
(2) to improve the qualifications of such persons who are serving Indian students
in such capacities. Grants for the purposes of this subsection may be used for the establishment of fellowship programs leading to an advanced degree, for institutes and, as
part of a continuing program, for seminars, symposia, workshops, and conferences. In
carrying out the programs authorized by this subsection, preference shall be given to the
training of Indians.
Id But see 25 U.S.C. § 2011 (1976) (permitting tribal organizations to waive the applicable preference laws); 20 U.S.C. § 1119(a) (1972) which had provided a preference for Indians to serve as
elementary and secondary school teachers but was repealed by the Educational Amendments Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, 90 Stat. 2152.
22. See 25 U.S.C. § 1633 (1976). See also 25 U.S.C. § 450e(b) (1976) which provides:
Any contract, subcontract, grant or subgrant pursuant to this Act, . . . [the Act of
April 16, 1934, as amended], or any other Act authorizing Federal contracts with or
grants to Indian organizations or for the benefit of Indians, shall require that to the
greatest extent feasible(1) preferences and opportunities for training and employment in connection with
the administration of such contracts or grants shall be given to Indians; and
(2) preference in the award of subcontracts and subgrants in connection with the
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and, in some instances, were enacted for specific tribes.23 In addition,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196424 exempts from its provisions
both private employers located on or near Indian reservations25 and
Indian tribes.26 Federal contractors located on or near a reservation
are permitted to give employment preference to Indians. 7 In addition
to the federal statutes permitting or requiring Indian employment prefadministration of such contracts or grants shall be given to Indian organizations and to
Indian-owned economic enterprises as defined in section 1452 of this title.
Id. On October 31, 1979 the Department of the Interior promulgated new regulations requiring
that preference be given to Indians in employment, training, contracting, and subcontracting
under certain categories of contracts. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,510 (1979) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 141.354, -7.5002 to .5003).
23. 25 U.S.C. § 633 (1976) provides:
Navajo and Hopi Indians shall be given, whenever practicable, preference in employment on all projects undertaken pursuant to sections 631-640 of this title, and, in furtherance of this policy may be given employment on such projects without regard to the
provisions of the civil-service and classification laws. To the fullest extent possible, Indian workers on such projects shall receive on-the-job training in order to enable them to
become qualified for more skilled employment.
Id.
24. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified in scattered sections of 2000e, 42 U.S.C.
(1976)).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1976):
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall apply to any business or enterprise on or
near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment practice
of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation.
Id.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976) provides:
For the purposes of this subchapter(b) The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a
person, but such term does not include (1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned
by the Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of
the District of Columbia subject by statute to procedures of the competitive service (as
defined in section 2102 of Title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than
a labor organization) which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26,
except that during the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer than twentyfive employees (and their agents) shall not be considered employers.
Id.
27. 41 C.F.R. 60-1.5(a)(6) (1979):
Work on or nearIndian reservations. It shall not be a violation of the equal opportunity clause for a construction or nonconstruction contractor to extend a publicly announced preference in employment to Indians living on or near an Indian reservation in
connection with employment opportunities on or near an Indian reservation. The use of
the word 'near' would include all that area where a person seeking employment could
reasonably be expected to commute to and from in the course of a work day. Contractors or subcontractors extending such a preference shall not, however, discriminate
among Indians on the basis of religion, sex, or tribal affiliation, and the use of such a
preference shall not excuse a contractor from complying with the other requirements
contained in this chapter.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1979

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 15 [1979], Iss. 4, Art. 4
TULSA LAWJO URJVAL
[Vol. 15:733

erence, Indians acquire added protection through laws which prohibit

employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Although in certain instances employment discrimination in favor of Indians is permitted, employment discrimination
against Indians is illegal.28
Section 12 of the IRA2 9 and the BIA's new policy of granting preference to qualified Indians for training, for appointment to original or
vacated positions, and for reinstatement and promotion,30 was upheld

by the United States Supreme Court in Morton v. Mancari.3 I In Mancarl, non-Indian BIA employees brought a class action claiming that
the Indian preference statutes had been repealed by the Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Act of 197232 (EEOA) and that they were unconstitutional as a denial of property without due process of law. 33 A three
judge district court panel held that section 11 of the EEOA34 implicitly
28. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-16
(1976). See D. Press, A Manual of Indian Employment Rights (1977) (prepared by ACKCO, Inc.,
and R.J. Associates, Inc., under Contract Number 76095 with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission):
At last count, there were over 20 different federal programs, administered by 15 different
agencies, directed to the objective of eradicating discrimination and promoting equal
opportunity in their employment.. . . For example, there is the Equal Employment
Division in the Office of Revenue Sharing, which monitors non-discrimination in state
and local governments that receive Revenue Sharing Grants. The Equal Opportunity
Component in the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) monitors recipients of LEAA funds, and on and on.
Id. at 83.
29. 25 U.S.C. § 472. See also note 15 supra.
30. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs issued a directive setting forth the BIA's new policy
V
in June of 1972:
The Secretary of the Interior announced today [June 26, 1972] he has approved the
Bureau's policy to extend Indian Preference to training and to filling vacancies by original appointment, reinstatement and promotions. The new policy was discussed with the
National President of the National Federation of Federal Employees under National
Consultation Rights NFFE has with the Department. Secretary Morton and I [Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Louis R. Bruce] jointly stress that careful attention must be
given to protecting the Rights of non-Indian employees. The new policy provides as
follows: Where two or more candidates who meet the established qualification requirements are available for filling a vacancy. If one of them is an Indian, he shall be given
preference in filling the vacancy. The new policy is effective immediately, and is incorporated into all existing programs such as the Promotion Program. Revised Manual
releases will be issued promptly for review and comment. You should take immediate
steps to notify all employees and recognized unions of this policy.
Personnel Management Letter No. 72-12, BIA, reprintedin Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 538
n.3. In Mancari, the Court characterized this new policy as "a logical extension of the Congressional intent" of § 12 of the IRA. Id. at 545.
31. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-6, 2000e-8 to 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-14, 2000e-16 to
2000e-17 (1976).
33. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1976) provides:
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except with
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repealed section 12 of the IRA because it prohibited racial discrimina-

tion in most federal employment35practices. The court, therefore, never

reached the constitutional issue.
In rejecting the district court's interpretation of the EEOA, the
Supreme Court examined the historical background and underlying intent of Congress in enacting both statutes. The Court also recognized
that Congress had expressly exempted both private employers on or
36
near a reservation and Indian tribes from coverage under Title VII.

The Court found "a clear congressional sentiment that an Indian preference in the narrow context of tribal or reservation-related employ-

ment did not constitute racial discrimination of the type otherwise
proscribed. '37 Emphasis was also attached to the fact that after the
EEOA was enacted, Congress passed two new Indian preference

laws.38
In Mancari,a unanimous Supreme Court also upheld Indian employment preference against the challenge that it constituted an invidious racial discrimination in violation of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution. Recognizing the "unique legal status" of
regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United States) in military departments,as defined in section 102 of Title 5, in executive agencies (other than the General
Accounting Office) as defined in section 105 of Title 5 (including employees and applicants for employment who are paid from nonappropriated funds), in the United States
Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units of the Government of the
District of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of the
legislative and judicial branches of the federal government having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
35. 359 F. Supp. 585 (D.N.M. 1973).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e-2(i). See also notes 25-26 supra.
37. 417 U.S. at 548. The Court noted:
In extending the general anti-discrimination machinery to federal employment in 1972,
Congress in no way modified these private employment preferences built into the 1964
Act, and they are still in effect. It would be anomalous to conclude that Congress intended to eliminate the longstanding statutory preferences on BIA employment; as being
racially discriminatory, at the very same time it was reaffirming the right of tribal and
reservation-related private employers to provide Indian preference.
Id. at 548.
38. The Court discussed 20 U.S.C. §§ 887c(a) and (d) (1976) (current version at Supp. II
1978). The Court stated:
It is improbable, to say the least, that the same Congress which affirmatively approved
and enacted these additional and similar Indian preferences was, at the same time, condemning the BIA preference as racially discriminatory. In the total absence of any manifestation of supportive intent, we are loathe to imply this improbable result.
417 U.S. at 548-49. For a more recent congressional enactment, see Act of December 5, 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-135, 93 Stat. 1056.
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Native American tribes39 and "the plenary power of Congress" in legislating for federally recognized tribes,4 0 the Court held that the prefer-

ence involved did not constitute racial discrimination. Indeed, it did
not even constitute a racial preference. Rather, the preference was an

employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the
needs of its constituent groups.4 ' Moreover, the preference was "rea'42
sonably and directly related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal."
39. For the numerous occasions in which the Supreme Court has upheld legislation favorable
to Indians see the Court's citations listed at 417 U.S. at 554-55.
40. Id. at 551. The Court noted:
The plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn
both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself. Article I, § 8, cl.
3, provides
Congress with the power to "regulate Commerce. . .with the Indian Tribes," and thus,
to this extent, singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate legislation. Article II,
§ 2, cl. 2, gives the President the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties. This has often been the source of the Government's power to deal
with the Indian tribes.
Id. at 551-52. See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
41. 417 U.S. at 553-54.
42. State statutes providing for Indian employment preference are to be analyzed according
to traditional three tier analysis: strict scrutiny; rational basis; intermediate scrutiny. The level of
judicial scrutiny to be applied when the Court finds a "suspect" class exists, such as an overt racial
classification, see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 232 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), or when the court
finds state action to infringe upon a fundamental right, is one of of strict scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966). When neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right is involved, the Court will
apply the rational basis standard. The latter test involves almost complete deference to the determination that has been made by the legislature. To be upheld, it is only required that the classification be rationally related to legitimate legislative goals. See, e.g., McGowen v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961); Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). In certain instances however, the Court has applied a middle level of scrutiny. This test requires that the classification
involved serve "important governmental objectives" and "be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (involving classification based
upon gender). See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimacy); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimacy); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). It is clear that the level of scrutiny to be applied is often
determinative of the issue of constitutionality. See generally Treiman, EqualProtection and FundamentalRights-A JudicialShell Game, 15 TULSA L.Y. 183 (1979).
With regard to state legislation providing for employment preference for Indians, there is a
strong argument that strict scrutiny should not be applied. The distinction between Indians and
non-Indians is perceivable as a political classification as opposed to a racial one, and therefore not
suspect. The political nature and status of Indian tribes is based upon federal law and the notion
of tribal sovereignty. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). It is also possible to argue that
non-Indians do not possess any of the "traditional indicia of suspectness. The class is not saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). In addition, it was recognized by the Mancari Court that Indian employment preference statutes do not involve the infringement of a fundamental right.
Even assuming that strict scrutiny is applicable, there may be state interests which qualify as
compelling ones. These interests might include reducing unemployment near reservations and
reducing problems arising in towns located near reservations which are caused directly or indi-
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Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, characterized the preference as "political rather than racial in nature"43 because it "applies only

to members of 'federally recognized' tribes.

rectly by unemployment on the reservation, such as loitering, vagrancy, public intoxication, and
disorderly conduct. See Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110, 1115-16 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,444 U.S. 870 (1979) (finding a compelling state interest) (dicta). See also Doores v. McNamara, 476 F. Supp. 987, 994-95 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (finding that the Kansas City Board of Police
Commissioners' affirmative action program satisfied compelling governmental action requirement
so as not to violate the equal protection clause). But no state interest will be sufficient to uphold
state action which conflicts with federal law. Eg., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164 (1973).
Inasmuch as strict scrutiny is inapplicable to determine the constitutionality cf Indian employment preference statutes, either the rational basis test or the middle level of scrutiny should be
applied. Application of either of these tests will result in a finding that the classification is constitutionally permissible.
It is unlikely that any substantive due process limitations will apply to the determination of
the constitutionality of Indian employment preference statutes other than the requirement that the
governmental action meet the strictures of the rational basis test. The Court has severely restricted
the requirements of substantive due process in the area of economic regulation. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding an Oklahoma law making it illegal for
anyone but a licensed optometrist or opthamologist to fit, replace, or duplicate lenses without a
prescription).
43. 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. Later, Justice Blackmun reiterated the point:
The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but,
rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion .... In the sense that there is no other group of
people favored in this manner, the legal status of the BIA is truly sui generis.
Id. at 554.
One article has stated that "It]he political classification is useful only in describing the group
to whom the government owes a unique trust relationship." Johnson & Crystal, IndiansandEqual
Protection, 54 WASH. L. REV. 587, 597-98 (1979). In a footnote they state:
The Court's characterizing the classification as political, however, is not useful in
determining what level of scrutiny to apply to federal Indian legislation in equal protection cases. A law may be suspect and subject to the strict scrutiny-compelling governmental interest test without discriminating against all members of a race. For example,
if the state of Washington enacted a law that all tribal Indians in the state must ride in
the rear of buses, or that all black members of the Democratic Party must use separate
rest rooms, such a law, although depending in part on a political classification, would
nonetheless be racially discriminatory. It would discriminate against many, although not
all, Indians or blacks in the state and would be subject to strict scrutiny.
Id. at 598 n.78.
The statement that the "political" classification fails to determine what level of scrutiny applies is incorrect. To illustrate this, it is helpful to compare, by way of example, an employment
preference statute with the laws posed in the above hypothetical. To argue that the classification is
not "political" would require acceptance of one of the following theories to uphold such a legislative classification:
(1) It could be argued that a preference statute, though making a "racial" classification,
does not involve an "invidious" discrimination and, therefore, is not subject to strict scrutiny. To
support this theory it would be argued that the non-Indian class, which would be discriminated
against, lacks any of the "traditional indicia of suspectness," San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). See note 57 infra and accompanying text. In addition
the assertion could be posed that this is a situation "where racial classifications are 'irrelevant and
therefore prohibited.'" Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978). In further support of this argument it would have to be argued that the classification would not cause
any stigma to attach to those discriminated against. Id. at 357-58.
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III.

TRIBAL EMPLOYMENT PREFERENCE LAWS

Tribal governments have responded to the employment needs of
Indians by enacting ordinances requiring businesses located on, and in
some instances near, 4 a reservation to give employment preference to
Indians. 5 Most ordinances empower the administering tribal agency
to: (1) impose numerical hiring goals and timetables specifying the
(2) As an alternative, it could be argued that the preference statute is "benign" or "remedial." The statute, therefore, will receive scrutiny less than strict but more than that accorded
under a rational basis test. Id. at 359. "([A] number of considerations--developed in genderdiscrimination cases but which carry even more force when applied to racial classifications-lead
us to conclude that racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.' ") Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317, (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976)). It should be noted that an Indian/non-Indian distinction would not "create the analytical
and practical problems present in preferential programs premised on racial or ethnic criteria"
which caused Justice Powell, in Bakke, to distinguish the cases relating to gender discrimination.
438 U.S. at 302-03. See also Caifano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (dealing with gender based
distinctions); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (gender); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974) (gender). The same would not pertain to laws in the hypothetical, which even if subject to
classification as "benign" or "remedial", would not meet the "important governmental objectives"
test of Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
(3) Finally, it could be argued that even though strict scrutiny applies, there is a compelling
governmental interest which would permit preference statutes, see note 61 infra, but not laws
simliar to those given in the above hypothetical.
While these alternative approaches exist, and may be upheld in some respects, see Livingston
v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979), the Supreme Court,
rather than adopting any of these alternative approaches, has consistently viewed the Indian/nonIndian distinction as a "political" classification and, therefore, has consistently applied the rational basis test. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). In Antelope, the Court sustained
the convictions of three Indians who, under federal law, had committed a first degree felonymurder. If these same individuals had been non-Indians, subject to the laws of Idaho, they could
not have been convicted of a felony-murder because Idaho law does not have such a provision,
and the prosecution would have been required to prove premeditation and deliberation. In sustaining the convictions, the Court held that the application of federal law was not based upon an
impermissible racial classification, but rather on a permissible political classification. See also
Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 85 (1977), in which the Court held that
Congress' omission of the descendants of a group of Delaware Indians, from funds in a distribution of a claims settlement did not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. In Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), the Court rejected the claim that denying
members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe access to Montana state courts in connection with an
adoption proceeding within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court constituted impermissible
racial discrimination. The Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court was not
based upon racial considerations, but rather, the political nature of the tribe.
44. The term "near" generally refers to a reasonable commuting distance from the reservation.
45. E.g., Spokane Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance, Res. No. 1979-218 (July 31, 1979);
Colo. River Indian Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. 32 (Sept. 8, 1979), Draft Guidelines
1. See generally D. Press, supra note 28. Some ordinances cover those businesses operating
"within the exterior boundaries" of the reservation. E.g., Crow Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. 79-27 (April 14, 1979); Seminole Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. C-109-80
(Jan. 11, 1980). There are 25 Indian Tribes with Indian employment preference ordinances in
effect on their reservations. Letter from Eleanor Norton, Chair, E.E.O.C., to Udall, Chum. House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs (Dec. 14, 1979).
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minimum number of Indians an employer must hire;4 6 (2) prohibit the

use of job qualifications or personnel procedures which, by their nature, tend to disqualify Indians and which are not absolutely necessary
for the employer's business;4 7 (3) require employers to provide or participate in training programs designed to increase the pool of qualified
Indians;4 8 (4) establish counseling and support for Indian workers, in

conjunction with federal and tribal offices, to assist Indian workers in
regaining employment; 49 and (5) provide for other requirements
designed to achieve increased Indian employment.5 0
Such ordinances generally apply to both Indian and non-Indian

employers, whether or not directly contracting with the tribe, and to
future as well as existing employers."

Existing employers are bound

by the ordinance only with respect to new hiring, so that no existing
employer is forced to fire any non-Indian employees.-2 The term "em-

ployer" applies to contractors, as well as subcontractors. 3 Employers
at
covered by a preference ordinance may also be subject to its terms
54
any other facilities of the employer located near the reservation.

Tribal ordinances establishing such preferential employment
46. E.g., Colo. River Indian Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. 32, § 6(a) (Sept. 8,
1979); see D. Press, supra note 28, at 17-24.
47. E.g., Colo. River Indian Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. 32, § 6(d); see D.
Press, supra note 28, at 24-28.
48. E.g., Colo. River Indian Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. 32, § 6(b); see D.
Press, supra note 28, at 32-34.
49. E.g., Colo. River Indian Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. 32, § 6(g); see D.
Press, supra note 28, at 164.
50. See generally D. Press, supra note 28, for an extensive overview of what other provisions
are generally imposed.
51. See generally Colo. River Indian Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. 32, § 3; D.
Press, supra note 28, at 43, app. A, at 10.
52. See generally D. Press, supra note 28, at 42-43, app. A, at 8, 10, 11. This provision may
limit the power of those tribes, which are "employers" within the meaning of their ordinances, to
fire non-Indians to hire tribal members. For example, in Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe No. C-74330 (D. Utah 1978) 5 Ind. L. Rep. L-20, the Ute tribe fired their non-Indian police chief to hire a
member in his place, pursuant to a member employment preference policy but involving no ordinance similar to that described above. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341 (1976), tribes are generally permitted to fire tribal employees who do not have an
enforceable expectation of continued employment under tribal law or by contract. See Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 577 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Arguably, a tribal employee obtains such an expectation under an employment rights ordinance which
includes the tribe as an "employer" and provides that no non-Indian employee of an existing
"employer" will lose his or her job to an Indian.
53. See generally D. Press, supra note 28, app. A, at 8.
54. See note 50 supra See also D. Press, supranote 28, app. A, at 8; notes 203-06 infra and
accompanying text. But see Memorandum from Thomas W. Fredericks, Associate Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, to Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, U.S.
Dept. of the Interior (May 25, 1978) at 3-4 (concluding that such a provision in the Colville Employment Rights Ordinance, Res. No. 1977-842 of the Colville Bus. Council, was invalid).
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rights for Indians also provide for monitoring and enforcement of the
ordinance by requiring a tribe to assert civil jurisdiction over non-Indi-

ans doing business on the reservation.5 5 Other sections provide for employee grievance procedures as well as for the establishment of a Tribal

to manage and coordinate impleEmployment Rights Office (TERO)
56
mentation of the ordinance.
A.

Legal Basis

Tribal authority to implement employment preference ordinances
is derived from two sources: (1) the inherent sovereignty of the tribe;
and (2) powers derived from tribal ownership of land."
1. Inherent Sovereignty
The notion that Indian tribes retain those aspects of sovereignty,
giving them the power, where not expressly limited by the federal gov-

ernment, to govern within their territory, has existed since the days of
the republic.5

The Supreme Court has recently addressed the nature

of this inherent tribal sovereignty:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique
55. See D. Press, supra note 28, at 22-24, app. A, at 17-19.
56. Id. at 9-10, 36-39, app. A, at 19-20.
57. See generally I AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 154
(1977).
58. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556, 560-62 (1832). See, e.g., United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Quiver v. United States, 241 U.S. 602 (1916); Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755 (1867); Ortiz-Barraza
v. United States, 517 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th
Cir. 1956). Felix Cohen has set forth the underlying tenets of tribal sovereignty:
Perhaps the most basic principle of all Indian law, supported by a host of decisions
. . . is the principle that thosepowerswhich arelawfully vestedin an Indiantribe arenot, in
general,delegatedpowersrgrantedbyexpressacts of Congress,but ratherinherentpowers of
a limitedsoverelnty which has never been extinguished.
F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (Univ. N.M. ed. 1971) (emphasis in original). Cohen's analysis of the relevant case law led him to conclude that:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal powers is
marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in
the first instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe
subject to the legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the
external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with
foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, le. its
powers of local self-government. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties
and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, full powers
of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs
of government.
Id. at 123 (footnotes omitted). See also Collins, Implied Limitations on the Jurisdictionof Indian
Tribes, 54 WASH. L. REV. 479, 480-84 (1979).
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and limited character. It exists only at the suffrance of Con-

gress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In

sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status. 9
It is clear that the nature of this sovereign power is not absolute. In
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,6 ° the Supreme Court held that the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction 6' by Indian tribes over non-Indians is
inconsistent with the status of tribes as nations dependent upon the

United States government.62 Conversely though, Oiphant does not
prohibit the exercise of civil regulatory jurisdiction by Indian tribes
over non-Indians.6 3
The Oiphant ruling invalidated two arrests of non-Indian residents by the Suquamish reservation's tribal police.6 4 One defendant,
Oliphant, was charged with assaulting a tribal officer and resisting arrest. Another defendant, Belgarde, was charged with recklessly endan-

gering a person's life and injuring tribal property.65

In reaching its decision, the Court relied on several closely related

factors, precipitating the conclusion that Indian tribes cannot exercise
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. First, the Court noted "the
59. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). In Wheeler a member of the Navajo
Tribe was indicted by a federal grand jury for statutory rape after being convicted in a tribal court
on a lesser charge. The defendant argued, and the district court agreed, that the federal prose'cution was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the source of a tribe's power to try tribal offenders derived from the tribe's
inherent sovereignty and not from any federally delegated powers. The Navajo Tribe has never
given up its authority to punish tribal offenders, nor has that power been lost by virtue of the
tribe's dependent status.
60. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
61. The Supreme Court emphasized the criminal nature of the case before it. Id. at 195, 196
n.7, 208. See also Collins, supra note 58, at 508 & n.163.
62. 435 U.S. at 208.
63. But see Trans-Canada Enterprises Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, No. C-77-882M
(W.D. Wash. July 27, 1978), 5 Ind. L. Rep. F-153, appealpending. See notes 78-95 infra and
accompanying text.
64. 435 U.S. 192-93. With regard to the reservation, the Court stated in a footnote that the
population of the reservation was 2,928 non-Indians and only 50 Indians. Id. at 193 n.l. The
Court also noted that 63% of the reservation was held in fee simple absolute by non-Indians.
The Suquamish Tribe had sought law enforcement assistance from both the local county and
the BIA which said that the tribe would have to provide its own law enforcement out of tribal
funds and with tribal personnel. At the time of Oliphant's arrest, the only law enforcement officers available were tribal deputies. These important facts, which were noted by the Ninth Circuit were not mentioned in the Supreme Court opinion. Oliphant v. Sehlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 101314 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'dsub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
65. 435 U.S. at 194. For a more detailed account of the facts see the Ninth Circuit's opinion,
544 F.2d at 1013-14.
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existence of comprehensive federal jurisdiction over the subject matter."6 6 Second, the Court relied on what it deemed to be a "commonly

shared presumption" of the three branches of government that Indian
tribes lacked the power to try non-Indians on criminal matters. 67 Considering this factor, the Court looked to early treaties and attorney general opinions, 6 ' early court decisions, 69 and some congressional
activity 7° for support. Third, the Court examined the dependency of

Indian tribes and found that "Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with their status.' ",71
Although the Court did not specify all of the "inherent limitations on

tribal powers,'

72

it did give some examples. 73 Finally, the Court em-

66. Collins, supra note 58, at 479, 487-88, 490. This factor is closely related to an argument

based upon preemption of tribal power by federal statutes that the Ninth Circuit rejected. 544
F.2d at 1010-11. The Supreme Court avoided express consideration of the preemption argument
by deciding upon other grounds. See Collins, supra note 58, at 487 & n.52, 488.
67. 435 U.S. at 206. See Collins, supra note 58, at 492-97.
68. 435 U.S. at 197 n.8, 198-99, 201, 206. See Collins, supranote 58, at 492-93, 496-97.
69. 435 U.S. at 199-201, 204, 206. See Collins, supra note 58, at 492 nn.78-79.
70. 435 U.S. at 201-03 & n.14, 204-06. See Collins, supra note 58, at 493-95.
71. 435 U.S. at 208. This limitation does not apply to tribal powers over members within the
reservation boundaries. United States v. Wheeler, 431 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). See Collins, supra
note 58, at 497-98. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980). The
court held that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe has the inherent power to levy a privilege tax on the
occupation of severing oil and gas from reservation land even though the tax falls on nonmembers. The court stated:
We recognize that in recent decisions bearing on the issue of inherent powers of Indian
Tribes, the Supreme Court has occasionally employed language suggesting that Indians
are without inherent powers over any nonmembers of their tribe. . . . For instance, the
Court in Wheeler described powers not retained by tribes as those that "would necessarily be lost by virtue of a tribe's dependent status." . . . For several reasons we do not
believe this language was intended to dispose of a case like the one at issue here.
First, the formulation seems to be merely descriptive of the conclusion that in certain circumstances powers were not retained, and is not a test for determining the existence of inherent powers. The critical factor in the cases is whether important interests of
the United States, other than Congress's basic interest in regulating the affairs of the
Indians, conflict with assertions of tribal authority. If the test is whether the asserted
tribal power is inconsistent with its dependent status, then the focal point becomes the
tribal position, which is always one of dependence upon the United States. Carried to its
logical conclusion, such a test would mean that a tribe possesses no inherent powers even
over its members, because the tribe's very existence would depend upon affirmative enabling legislation by Congress. To the extent a tribe could exert power over its members,
that power could only derive from the tribe's existence as a private, voluntary association. These conclusions are fundamentally inconsistent, of course, with the teachings of
other decisions of the Court. The Court has expressly rejected the contention the tribes
are no more than private, voluntary associations, . . and has consistently held that
tribal powers of self-government are inherent, derived from the tribe's original status as
independent sovereign nations.
Id. at 542 (emphasis is in original) (citations omitted).
72. 435 U.S. at 209.
73. 435 U.S. at 209, giving as examples: the power to convey land to anyone but the sover-
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phasized that there was a federal overriding interest in protecting citizens "from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."7 4 The
Court noted that few tribes had formal court systems or written laws
which would afford non-Indians the same rights they were guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights.7 5
In applying Oliphant to the question of tribal civil regulatory juris-

diction, the same factors must be examined and the federal, tribal, and
state interests must be balanced.7 6 Oiphant itself was expressly limited
to criminal jurisdiction,7 7 and its rationale is not applicable to civil regulatory jurisdiction. Conversely, there is not the same degree of federal
statutory involvement in tribal civil matters as there is in tribal criminal

matters.7 8 Thus, if tribes are found to lack civil regulatory jurisdiction,
then jurisdiction would be in the states. 79 However, states do not have

the same protective motives for Indians and their land as does the federal government.8 °
In addition, the shared presumption of all three branches of government is that tribes do retain civil regulatory jurisdiction. Courts
eign, Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); and the power to deal with foreign
nations, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
74. 435 U.S. at 210.
75. Id. at 197, 210-11.
76. See Collins, supra note 58, at 491. Even though Collins questions the Court's application
of these factors with regard to criminal jurisdiction in O0hihantitself, id. at 492-507, he uses these
same factors in determining whether Oliphant covers civil regulatory jurisdiction. Id. at 508-10.
77. 435 U.S. at 195, 196 n.7, 208.
78. See Collins, supra note 58, at 509 & n.169; Note, Balancingthe Interests in Taxation of
Non-Indian Activities on Indian Landr, 64 IoWA L. REV. 1459, 1468 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Balancing the Interests]. Some civil matters which are governed by federal statute include: regulation of trade with Indians, 25 U.S.C. §§ 261-264 (1976); liquor controls, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154-1156,
1161 (1976); and misrepresentation in the sale of "Indian" products, 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (1976).
79. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 474 n.13, 481 n.17 (1976);
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). See Collins, supranote 58, at 509
& n. 171. See also McCoy, The Doctrineof TribalSovereignty: .4ccommodating Tribal,State, and
FederalInterests, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 357 (1978), where the author states:
A tribe has interests in enforcing its civil regulatory laws over non-Indians to preserve
law and order and to protect the lifestyle within the boundaries of its reservation. Unlike
the tribal criminal laws in Oliphant, tribal civil regulatory laws can seldom be enforced
in federal courts. To protect their interests, tribes need independent authority to compel
non-Indians to comply through civil enforcement proceedings in tribal courts.
Id. at 420-21.
80. Balancing the Interests, supra note 78, at 1468-69 & nn.59-60. See United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, (1886):
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the
United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political
rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies.
Id. at 383-84 (emphasis in original).
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have upheld tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians within the reservation since the early 1900's. 1' The Supreme Court in Morris P. Hitchcock 82 upheld an annual privilege or permit tax upon livestock of
nonmembers of the Chickasaw Nation enacted by the legislature of the
Chickasaw Nation. Even after the decision in Ol4hant, the federal

courts continued to support tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. 3
The executive branch has also supported tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians. As early as 1855 the Attorney General of
the United States determined that tribes may exercise civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians within their territory.8 4 When Congress enacted the

Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934, it authorized tribes to exercise powers "vested . . .by existing law" in addition to those specifically vested by the statute. Contemporaneous with the enactment of
the IRA, the Department of the Interior, as the administering agency,
published an extensive analysis of the retained powers included within

this phase.

6

In that analysis, the Department concluded that "over all

81. See Morris v. Hitchcock, 21 App.D.C. 565, aft'd, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (upholding a tribal
tax on non-Indian owned cattle which were grazed on tribal land based upon both a retained
power to tax as well as the power to exclude non-members from the reservation and to condition
entry); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980) (upholding a tribal severance tax on oil and gas as within the tribe's inherent sovereign powers); Barta v. Oglala Sioux
Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959) (upholding a license tax on
nonmembers leasing trust lands on the reservation for use of grazing and farm lands based on
inherent sovereignty); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956) (upholding a
grazing tax based on inherent sovereignty); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal
dismissed without opinion, 203 U.S. 599 (1906) (upholding a permit tax of a resident non-Indian,
based in part upon the power to prescribe terms on which noncitizes may transact business on
the reservation and in part upon retained sovereign powers); Maxey v. Wright, 54 S.W. 807 (Ct,
App. Indian Terr. 1900), affd without opinion, 105 F. 1003 (8th Cir. 1900) (tribal occupation tax on
nonmember attorneys practicing law in federal courts located on the reservation upheld).
82. 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
83. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980); Wilson v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 459 F. Supp. 366 (D.N.D. 1978) (eviction of nonmember Indian
for failure to pay rent to Turtle Mt. Housing Auth. and holding over after termination of lease);
Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, No. C-74-330 (D. Utah May 24, 1978) 5 Ind. L. Rep. L-20, appeal
pending (release of non-Indian tribal police chief so that member of Tribe could be placed in that
position); Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. Navajo Tribe of
Indians, No. 78-352 (D. Ariz. July 11, 1978) appealpending,(upholding possessory interest tax
levied on mineral lessees of tribal lands).
A little over two months after its decision in Ol4hant, the Supreme Court, in Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), stated: "Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as
appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and
property interests of both Indians and non-Indians." Id. at 65.
84. 7 Op. ATr'y GEN. 174 (1855). See also 17 Op. Arr'v GEN. 134 (1881); 18 Op. Arr'y
GEN. 34, 36 (1884); 23 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 214, 217-18 (1900).
85. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976) "In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal
council by existing law.. ." d.
86. Powers ofIndian Tribes, 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934). This comprehensive statement of
retained sovereign powers was relied upon after Olphant in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
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the lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe, by members

thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the sovereign power of determining the conditions upon which persons shall be permitted to enter its

domain, to reside therein, and to do business .

*"87

regulations8"

promulgated by the Department of the InteThe new
rior pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 9 expressly recognize the authority of tribes to enact their own
Indian preference requirements. 90 Moreover, the Associate Solicitor in

the Division of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior has
recently upheld the validity of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians with
regard to the Colville Employment Rights Ordinance. 91

Congress has recognized and supported tribal sovereignty to regulate non-Indians within their territory in a number of statutes. As
noted above, section 16 of the IRA9 2 was one such statute. Congress
has also endorsed tribal regulation of non-Indians in other areas by

making it a federal crime to violate tribal regulations governing liquor
sales, hunting, and fishing. 93
Finally, an important factor considered by the Oihant Court was
that the rights guaranteed to criminal defendants in state and federal
313, 317 n.7, 328 (1978), to show that the IRA did not create or delegate authority for Indian tribes
to govern themselves.
87. 55 Interior Dec. at 50. See id. at 46; F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
122-50 (Univ. N.M. ed. 1971).
88. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,510 (1979) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. §§ 14-1.354, -7.5002 to .5003).
89. 25 U.S.C. § 450e(b) (1976).
90. Tribal preference requirements. (I) Where the work under a contract is to be performed on an Indian reservation, the procuring activity may supplement the clause set
forth in § 14-7.5003 [44 Fed. Reg. 62,514-515] of this chapter by adding specific Indian
preference requirements of the Tribe on whose reservation the work is to be performed ...
(2) Nothing in these regulations shall be interpreted to preclude Tribes from independently developing and enforcing their own tribal preference requirements. Such independently developed tribal preference requirements shall not, except as provided in
§ 14-1.354(e)(1) above, become a requirement in contracts covered under this § 14-1.354
and must not hinder the Government's right to award contracts and to administer their
provisions.
44 Fed. Reg. 62,513-14 (1979) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 14-1.354(e)).
Nothing in the requirements of this clause shall be interpreted to preclude Indian
Tribes from independently developing and enforcing their own Indian preference requirements. Such requirements must not hinder the Government's right to award contracts and to administer their provisions.
44 Fed. Reg. 62,515 (1979) (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 14-7.5003(c)).
91. Memorandum from Thomas W. Fredericks, Office of the Area Director, Portland Area
Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior, to Superintendent, Colville
Agency (Aug. 4, 1978) (regarding approval of Colville Employment Rights Ordinance Res. No.
1978-557 (July 31, 1978)). [hereinafter cited as Fredericks].
92. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976). See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
93. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161, 1165 (1976). See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
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courts were not fully guaranteed in tribal courts. "[T]his interest is
weakened since the due process requirements in civil enforcement proceedings are far more limited than those in criminal cases." 94
2.

Powers Derived from Tribal Ownership of Land

While not as important to the Indian tribes as powers derived from
their inherent sovereignty, nor as expansive,9 5 there is some basis for
finding that tribes have the authority to impose employment preference

requirements on reservation employers. This arises from the tribe's
power to exclude or remove persons from their territory and to impose

conditions before granting permission to enter upon tribal lands.96
This authority was recognized in 1821 by Attorney General Wirt:
So long as a tribe exists and remains in possession of its lands,
its title and possession are sovereign and exclusive; and there

exists no authority to enter upon their lands, for any purpose
whatever, without their consent. .

.

. Although the Indian

title continues only during their possession, yet that possession has always been held sacred, and can never be disturbed
but by their consent. They do not hold under the States, nor
under the United States; their title is original, sovereign, and
exclusive. We treat with them as separate sovereignties; and
while an Indian nation continues to exist within its acknowledged limits, we have no more right to enter upon their territory, without their consent, than we have to enter upon the
territory of a foreign prince.97
Some courts upholding tribal power over non-Indians also based their
98
findings on the tribal authority to remove or expel non-members,
94. McCoy, supra note 79, at 421. In a footnote, McCoy states:
The criminal trial guarantees of the sixth amendment have been held inapplicable to
civil enforcement proceedings. . . . The double jeopardy clause has also generally been
held inapplicable to civil penalty proceedings .... Furthermore, the procedural due
process rights in civil penalty proceedings seldom include more than the opportunity to
be heard. . . . When a civil enforcement proceeding is dependent on a conviction in a
criminal case or could give rise to a later criminal prosecution for the same incident, the
.. This line of cases
Court has exhibited greater concern for the defendant's ights..
has no effect on the due process requirements in tribal civil enforcement proceedings
because Olphant precludes a subsequent tribal criminal proceeding against a non-Indian.
Id. at 421 n.285 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557-58
(1975).
95. See note 101 infra.
96. See 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 156-58; F. CoHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW at 142-45, 332; Collins, supra note 58, at 513, 528
nn.294-97; Balancing the Interests, supra note 78, at 1466.
97. 1 Op.ATT'Y GEN. 465, 466-67 (1829).
98. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905),
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while others do not.9 9 This explanation of tribal authority, however,
inadequately covers all the situations in which regulatory authority has
been, and needs to be, exercised. 10 0
3.

Others

There are other possible legal premises upon which tribal authority can be based. One is an express grant of power by statute. In United
States v. Mazurie,'0 ' the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
Congress could not delegate power to Indian tribes since they were

only "private, voluntary organizations." The Court stated that "Indian
tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over
both their members and their territory . . . . [They] are a good deal
more than 'private, voluntary organizations.' " 02 There are presently

no federal statutes delegating authority to Indian tribes to impose Indian employment preference standards.
Another basis for tribal authority arises from powers expressly re-

served by tribes in treaties. Some treaties exist which have, by their
terms, been recognized as reserving the right to determine the condi-

tions upon
which non-Indians can reside or-use land on the reserva03
tion. 1
appealdismissed without opinion, 203 U.S. 599 (1906); Maxey v. Wright, 54 S.W. 807 (Ct. App.
Ind. Terr. 1900), aj'dwithout opinion 105 F. 1003 (8th Cir. 1900). See also 23 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 214
(1900).
99. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980); Barta v. Oglala Sioux
Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux
Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
100. See 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT (1977):
Yet repeatedly, the Solicitor's Office encountered situations requiring some identifiable regulatory authority, either Federal, State, or tribal, to regulate the conduct of nonIndians or nonmembers within Indian country that could only be accounted for by finding some power inherent in Indian tribes that arose from some source other than the
simple power to expel or remove. Thus it was held that the tribes might seize stray cattle
of a non-Indian which trespassed upon tribal property and sell the same at a public
auction in order to cover the expenses of the tribe, that the tribes might confiscate unlicensed dogs of non-Indians in furtherance of tribal police powers, that tribes might seize
and forfeit the fishing equipment of a non-Indian fishing within the reservation in violation of tribal laws, and that a tribal court could enter a decree of divorce in a marriage
between an Indian and a non-Indian.
Clearly, the conception that the power of a tribe was limited to its power of removal
from the reservation was not adequate to the law enforcement or regulatory needs of
government in Indian country.
Id. at 158 (footnotes omitted).
101. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
102. Id. at 557 (tribal jurisdiction to control the sale of liquor on privately held lands within
the reservation boundaries).
103. See Treaty with the Navajo Indians, June 1, 1868, United States-Navajo Indians, art. 2,
15 Stat. 667, 668. The Treaty provided that the reservation was set aside "for the use and occupation of the Navajo tribe of Indians" and that "no persons except those herein so authorized to do,
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One final basis of power upon which tribal employment preference
ordinances might be based is the tribe's contractual power. Substantial
economic activity on reservations often leads to commercial contracts

between the tribe and third parties. These include contracts to rent
land or buildings from the tribe, to lease tribal minerals or resources, or

to construct projects requiring tribal money. Before entering into such
agreements, the tribe may require the other party to comply with all
tribal ordinances, including those involving employment preference."°

As noted above, such agreements do not violate Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.105
B.

Limitations
There can be little doubt that tribes have retained some civil regu-

latory powers, even over non-Indians. But problems arise in determining the extent of such powers, especially those concerning enforcement

of tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians. This section
will address these problems.
1. General Limitations Upon Inherent Sovereign Powers
The power to regulate business on the reservation has not been

withdrawn by treaty' 06 or statute. For the most part, this power is not
inconsistent with Indian tribes' status as dependent nations.10 7 There
may, however, be certain tribal ordinances which exceed the thin and
uncertain line between what may be regarded as consistent with this
status, and what may be regarded as inconsistent.10 8
and except such officers, soldiers, agents, and employes of the government, or of the Indians, as
may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties imposed by law, or the
orders of the President, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory
described in this article." McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1973). See
also Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969). Virtually identical language is found in
many Indian treaties. Eg., Treaty with the Crows, May 7, 1868, United States-Crow Indians, art.
2, 15 Stat. 649; Treaty with the Sioux, April 29, 1868, United States-Sioux Indians, art. 2, 15 Stat.
635; Treaty with the Ute, March 2, 1868, United States-Ute Indians, art. 2, 15 Stat. 619; Treaty
with the Cheyenne and Arapaho, October 28, 1867, United States-Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians, art. 2, 15 Stat. 593; Treaty of Point Elliott, January 22, 1855, United States-Dwamish, Suquamish and other allied and subordinated Indian tribes in the Washington Territory, art. 2, 12
Stat. 927. See also Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384, 389 (1904).
104. Cowan v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 404 F. Supp. 1338, 1340 (D.S.D. 1975); D. Press, supra
note 28, at 46-47. See also Collins, supra note 58, at 515.
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(b), 2000e-2(i) (1976).
106. This comment is made in a general way and does not express an absolute conclusion that
no treaty exists which may be interpreted as precluding such an ordinance.
107. See notes 22-37 supra.
108. See notes 174-97 infra and accompanying text.
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The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968109

The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) was enacted by Congress to

protect both Indians and non-Indians" 0 from arbitrary tribal action.

The Act was also designed to maintain tribal culture and to strengthen
tribal governments."' The ICRA purports to affect "all governmental

powers possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial.""' 2 Provisions in Title I of that Act" 3 are known as the "Indian
Bill of Rights" since, with some notable exceptions, they were derived
from the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution." 4
In Santa ClaraPueblo v. Martinez,"15 the Supreme Court held that

the ICRA does not implicitly authorize private causes of action in federal courts." 6 Federal jurisdiction under the ICRA was found to be
limited to writs of habeas corpus." 7 The Court realized that, in the
civil context, this would mean that tribal forums"I would have exclu109. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1976).
110. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 933-34 (10th Cir. 1975); Dodge v.
Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26, 31-32 (D. Ariz. 1969); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17, 24-25 (D. Ariz.
1968).
I11. O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1973). See also
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62; Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc.,
506 F.2d 1231, 1237 (4th Cir. 1974) (overruled by Martinez, Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians, 584 F.2d 45, 46 (4th Cir. 1978)).
112. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1976).
113. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1976).
114. Some of the differences are: There are no provisions in the ICRA equivalent to the second, third or seventh amendments. The equal protection clause of the ICRA, § 1302(8), differs
from the fourteenth amendment in that § 1302(8) guarantees the equal protection of the tribe's
laws, not of "the laws." The due process clause of§ 1302(8) does not include "life" as a protected
interest as do the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Section 1302(7), which prohibits excessive
bail or fines and cruel and unusual punishments, sets an absolute limit on punishment by the tribe
ofsix months imprisonment and a $500 fine. There is no requirement that tribal criminal prosecutions be initiated by grand jury indictment. The establishment clause of the first amendment is
not present in the ICRA, permitting establishment of religion. The ICRA also provides that a
criminal defendant has a right to assistance of counsel at his own expense, § 1302(6), contrary to
the requirements of the sixth amendment. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). See Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 63 n.14 (1978); Johnson and Crystal, supranote 42, at 618
n.176.
115. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
116. Id. at 59-72.
117. Id. at 66-72; 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
118. 436 U.S. at 65-66, 71-72. The Court noted, in the following language, that tribal forums
included nonjudicial tribal institutions.
Moreover, contrary to the reasoning of the court below, implication of a federal
remedy in addition to habeas corpus is not plainly required to give effect to Congress'
objective of extending constitutional norms to tribal self-government. Tribal forums are
available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA, and [25 U.S.C.] § 1302 has the substantial and intended effect of changing the law which these forums are obliged to apply.
Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as ,appropriate forums for the exclusive
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.. . . Nonjudicial tribal institutions have also been recognized as
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sive jurisdiction. The Court, however, went on to note that:

Congress retains authority expressly to authorize civil actions
for injunctive or other relief to redress violations of [the
ICRA], in the event that the tribes themselves prove deficient

in applying and enforcing its substantive provisions. But unless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit the
additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of
such actions in a federal forum would represent, we are constrained to find that [the ICRA] does not impliedly authorize

actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the
tribe or its officers.19
Some courts have distinguished Martinez on the ground that the

controversy there concerned an intra-tribal dispute, and its holding
should not, therefore, apply to disputes between Indians and non-Indians.120 Such arguments are based on a distinction not made in Mar1nez. To the contrary, the Court stated that "[t]ribal courts have
repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive ad-

judication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians andnon-Indians."''z The Supreme Court may have

left open one possible avenue for relief in a forum other than those of
the tribe. In a footnote, Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,

noted that under many Indian Reorganization Act constitutions, 22
though not the Santa Clara Pueblo, Department of the Interior approval of tribal ordinances is required before they may go into effect.
Justice Marshall stated that "[i]n these instances, persons aggrieved by
tribal laws may, in addition to pursuing tribal remedies, be able to seek
Under these circumstances, we are reluctant to
competent law-applying bodies ....
disturb the balance between the dual statutory objectives which Congress apparently
struck in providing only for habeas corpus relief.
Id. at 65-66. Along these lines, the Court noted that the Santa Clara Pueblo had, in its constitution approved by the Secretary of the Interior, vested judicial authority in its tribal council. Id. at
66 n.22. See Ziontz, After Martinez:

Civil Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 U. CAL. D. L.

REv. 1 (1979).
119. 436 U.S. at 72, speaking specifically of § 1302 of the ICRA. See Ziontz, supra note 118,
at 25-33.
120. Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, No. C-77-882M (W.D.
Washington, July 27, 1978), 5 Ind. L. Rep. F-153, appealpending.
121. 436 U.S. at 65 (footnote and citations omitted) (emphasis added); Wilson v. Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 459 F. Supp. 366, 368-69 (D.N.D. 1978).
122. Pursuant to the IRA, Indian tribes, at their option, 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1976), could adopt a
constitution and by-laws by which to govern their reservations. 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-477 (1976). In
1947 it was reported that 181 tribes had accepted the Act, 77 had declined it and 14 came under it
because they had not voted. Within 12 years after the IRA was enacted, 161 constitutions and 131
corporate charters had been adopted. Comment, TribalSelf-Government andthe Indian Reorganl-

zation Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. Rav. 955, 972 (1972).
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relief from the Department of the Interior."' 2 3 To date, no federal
court has granted jurisdiction on this basis. 24
a.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act:
What Standard of Review? 125

In Martinez, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the
case 12 6 and, therefore, never directly addressed the problem of applicable standards under the ICRA equal protection clause. The Court did
note, however, that the application of the ICRA equal protection clause
by the federal courts in civil cases "may substantially interfere with a

tribe's ability to maintain itself as a culturally and politically distinct
entity."' 2 7 The Court said, in recognizing a tribe's right to determine

its own membership, that because of "the often vast gulf between tribal
traditions and those with which federal courts are more intimately familiar, the judiciary should not rush to create causes of action that
would intrude on these delicate matters."' 28 The Court's statement expressed its concern for striking a balance among individual rights and

tribal cultural and governmental identity as was intended by Congress. 129
123. 436 U.S. at 66 n.22 (dictum). See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 558 n.12
(1975) (Court noted with favor that the Secretary must approve any tribal ordinance limiting sale
of liquor on the reservation before violation of the ordinance becomes a federal offense);
Goldberg, A Dynamic View of Tribal Jurisdictionto Tax Non-Indians, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
166, 173-75 (1976).
124. Telephone conversation with Francis Ayer, Solicitor's Office, Dept. of the Interior, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 26, 1979). See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980)
(plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Interior on the basis that in approving the tribe's tax ordinance
he violated the Administrative Procedures Act but abandoned this claim at trial).
A distinction should be made between suits against Interior officials for decisions for which
they are responsible, involving such things as grant disbursement, and suits against Interior officials for approving a tribal ordinance which violates some federal law or constitutional provision.
125. As a result of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), challenges to tribal
laws may only be brought in tribal forums unless upon a writ of habeas corpus. This discussion of
an applicable standard for reviewing cases under the ICRA is based largely upon federal court
decisions predating Martinez. The analysis may or may not be applied by tribal forums upon
review under the ICRA. See note 138 infra.
126. Martinez involved an ordinance of the Santa Clara Pueblo which denied tribal membership to the children of female members who had married non-members of the Pueblo, while permitting enrollment of children of male members who had married non-members of the Pueblo.
The district court held the ordinance did not violate the ICRA equal protection requirement because it was based upon Pueblo tradition. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5
(D.N.M. 1975). The circuit court of appeals reversed finding that the interest of the individual
member outweighed the tribal interest involved. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039
(10th Cir. 1975).
127. 436 U.S. at 72 (footnote omitted).
128. Id. at 72 n.32.
129. Id. at 62-66 (citing relevant legislative history); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe,
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While the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of striking this balance, some lower federal courts have. These decisions were

rendered prior to Martinez and discussed the issue only after basing
jurisdiction upon grounds now rejected by Martnez. 30 The general

approach seems to involve a balancing of the individual rights granted
by the ICRA against the historical, governmental, and cultural interests

of the tribe, with deference given to tribal customs and traditions.

31

In

one of the first appellate court decisions involving the ICRA, the
Eighth Circuit noted: "[I]t is clear to us that Congress wished to protect

and preserve individual rights of the Indian peoples, with the realization that this goal is best achieved by maintaining the unique Indian
' 32
culture and necessarily strengthening tribal governments."'
The conventional approach to equal protection claims under the
482 F.2d 1140, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1973); S.REP. No. 721, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, rerintedin[1968]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1837, 1863-67. See Johnson and Crystal, supra note 42, at 619-25.
130. Relying on Martinez, several cases have been dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction.
E.g., Mousseaux v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 582 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1978); Crowe v. Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians, 584 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1978); Sturdevant v. Wilber, 456 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Wis.
1978); Salt River Project Agri. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, No. 78352 Phx.WPC (D. Ariz. 1978) 5 Ind. L. Rep. F-116, appealpending;Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian
Community, 455 F. Supp. 462 (D. Mont. 1978); Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, No. C74-330 (D.
Utah 1978) 5 Ind. L. Rep. L-20; Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir.
1975). See Ziontz, supra note 118, at 9 n.53, where the author notes:
Absent any jurisdiction, and given the retroactivity of Martinez, prior federal decisions
would appear to be a nullity....
One question of importance to tribal government is the weight to be given prior
substantive rulings under the ICRA. While those decisions may no longer stand as conclusive and binding interpretations of the ICRA, they cannot safely be ignored.
Id.
131. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1045-46 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'don other
grounds,436 U.S. 49 (1978); Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976); Wounded
Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1975); Daly v. United
States, 483 F.2d 700, 705-06 (8th Cir. 1973); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d
1140, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1973); Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150-51 (D.S.D. 1974), remanded
on other grounds, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975).
132. O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1973) (footnote
omitted). The court further stated:
In addition, Congress was sensitive to the possibility of disrupting the Indian governments when it passed the Indian Bill of Rights: "Discussion of the Indian Bill of Rights
showed no intent to use the statute as an instrument for modifying tribal cultural attitudes in order to facilitate assimilation of Indians into the non-Indian community. In
fact, the committee showed a positive intent to avoid requirements injurious to the tribe's
capacity to function as autonomous governmental units."
Id. at 1145. Johnson and Crystal, in their recent look at equal protection, note:
In the absence of a conclusive answer, [from the Supreme Court] the lower federal
court decisions have varied considerably. However, they have generally accorded considerable weight to Indian cultural autonomy and traditional values and have given considerable deference to the judgment of tribal governments.
Johnson and Crystal, supra note 42, at 620.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss4/4

24

1980]

Andrson: Indian Employment Preference: Legal Foundations and Limitations
IND14N EMPLOYMENT PREFERENCE

federal constitution involves three levels of scrutiny. 13 3 Where action
by a government 134 is based on a "suspect" classification, such as racial
classification, or impinges upon a "fundamental right," review of that

action will be based on a standard of "strict scrutiny," requiring the
action to be struck down absent a compelling state interest. Without a

suspect classification or infringement upon a fundamental right, review
will proceed under a "rational basis" standard. Certain classifications,
although not "suspect," have been reviewed under a mid-level of scrutiny lying somewhere between the above extremes. This intermediate
test requires that state action serve "important governmental objec-

tives" and
"be substantially related to achievement of those objec1 35
tives."
While it is clear that the ICRA equal protection clause does not

apply to tribal governments in the same manner that federal constitutional provisions apply to federal and state governments,1 36 some federal courts have found that the equal protection analysis developed
under the federal constitution serves as a persuasive guide in reviewing

actions arising under ICRA provisions."
With regard to tribal ordinances requiring Indian employment
preference, there is a strong argument that strict scrutiny is an inappro-

priate standard of review. This conclusion is persuasive in light of
modem equal protection analysis and principles. 3 8 If the congres133. See note 42 supra.
134. The ICRA applies to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of tribal governments. See note 120 supra.
135. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
136. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1045, 1047 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'don other
grounds,436 U.S. 49 (1978); Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976); Wounded
Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1975); McCurdy v.
Steele, 506 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir. 1974); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th Cir. 1973);
Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 678, 681-82 (10th'Cir. 1971); Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp.
1143, 1150-51 (D.S.D. 1974), remanded on other grounds, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975); Yellow
Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438, 440 (D.S.D. 1974); Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp.
619, 621-22 (D.N.D. 1973). Cf.White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1313-14 (8th Cit.
1973) (consideration different where voting procedures adopted by the Tribe are identical to anglo
procedures).
137. Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1047 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). See Johnson and Crystal, supra note 42, where the authors state:
Cases involving the ICRA equal protection clause have used standard constitutional
equal protection language for determining the validity of tribal action challenged under
that act. The difference between these cases and cases involving the equal protection
clause of the constitution lies in the application of the guarantee: the courts give special
deference to long established tribal customs and tradition in the ICRA cases.
Id. at 628 (emphasis supplied). See also note 130 supra.
138. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
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sional policy favoring a strenghtening of tribal governments 139 is added
to the conventional factors considered in the equal protection analysis
under the ICRA,14 ° the conclusion that strict scrutiny is inappropriate
is even more compelling.
One reason for this conclusion is that the distinction between Indians and non-Indians is a political distinction, not a racial one. Thus,
analysis must proceed under the rational basis test. 14 1 That test must
be used where "the preference is reasonably and directly related to a
legitimate, nonracially based goal."' 142 Increased economic development on Indian reservations has increased the number of non-Indians
living on or near reservations. 43 This has caused a political and cultural strain on many reservations which might be alleviated by reducing the incentives for non-Indian labor on or near reservations, and by
training and hiring more Indian labor.'" Thus, employment preference supports a tribal goal which, stated in its most basic terms, involves the maintenance of tribal identity, integrity, custom, and, in
some circumstances, its very existence. Tribal preference ordinances
also correct much of the discrimination which has kept reservation Indians from getting jobs or job training. 14 Additionally, tribes have an
interest in creating and maintaining a job market on the reservation to
encourage Indian labor to remain. Consideration of these factors
makes it likely that differing treatment
for Indians and non-Indians
46
will be upheld under this test.1

139. See 25 U.S.C. § 450a (1976); O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140,
1144-45 (8th Cir. 1973); Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619, 621-22 (D.N.D. 1973).
140. O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140, 1144-45 (8th Cir. 1973).
141. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
142. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974).
143. 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 338-39, 342-43
(1977).
144. Id. at 342-43.
145. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (upholding, under
Title VII, an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances).
146. It should be noted that the Supreme Court's emphasis in Mancari upon Congress'
"unique obligation" towards Indians was important in determining what constituted "a legitimate,
nonracially based goal" under the rational basis standard employed in that case. Once the goal
sought to be achieved has been identified----"to further Indian self-government" in Mancari-the
means employed need merely be "reasonably and directly related" to it. 417 U.S. at 554-55.
Thus, absence of such a "unique obligation" towards Indians by either state or tribal governments
does not foreclose the existence of other "legitimate nonracially based" goals which may be dealt
with in statutes by making a distinction between Indians and non-Indians. The Supreme Court's
statement that "a blanket exemption for Indians from all civil service examinations" presents an
"obviously more difficult question," id. at 554, does not detract from this view of the test. Such an
exemption would be "more difficult" to justify as being "reasonably related" to furthering the goal
of "Indian self-government" involved in that case.
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Even if the distinction between Indians and non-Indians is consid-

ered a "racial" classification, it is not necessarily subject to strict scrutiny. For that standard to apply, the classification must be suspect or

the right impaired must be fundamental. Employment preference statutes, however, protect no fundamental right,

47

nor are non-Indian

classifications suspect. These classifications simply do not bear the
"traditional indicia of suspectness."'

48

Moreover, this is not an in-

stance in which racial classifications are "irrelevant and therefore prohibited."' t49 No stigma attaches to those discriminated against,15 0 and

no presumptively invidious discrimination is involved.' 51 Congress, for

example, when enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,152
recognized that "an Indian preference in the narrow context of tribal or

reservation-related employment did not constitute racial discrimination
of the type otherwise proscribed" by Title VII.15 3 The Tenth Circuit

reached a similar result, holding that a state Indian employment preference policy does not involve any "racial, stigmatized discrimination
against the white majority." ''54 These considerations simply illustrate
that under tribal employment preference ordinances, there will be no
absolute bar to employment of non-Indians and 5no non-Indians will

lose his or her job to make space for an Indian.'-

147. See note 42 supra.
148. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). See note 42
supra. It should be noted that with regard to tribal governmental action, unlike action by state
governments, it can be said that the non-Indian class is in a "position of political powerlessness."

Only members of the tribe may be involved in the "political process" on most reservations and
non-Indians may not become members. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557-58
(1975). This concern is negated somewhat by the fact that the non-Indian class can be said to have
a majoritarian control over Congress which, in turn, has been said to have plenary authority over
the powers of government which the tribes otherwise possess. Eg., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 57 (1978); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
149. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring
in the judgment in part, dissenting in part). See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
150. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357-58 (1978).
151. This is unlike the situation in Martinez, where the circuit court found invidious sex discrimination in a tribal ordinance under which the children of a mixed marriage would be members of the tribe only if the father were a member. The circuit court distinguished blood quantum
requirements for tribal membership and office holding from those involved in that case, based on
sex. The former requirements were said to have "some semblance of basis for the classification"
unlike that of sex. 540 F.2d at 1046.
152. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-6, 2000e-8 to 2000e-9, 2000e-13 to 2000e-14, 2000e-16 to
2000e-17 (1976).
153. 417 U.S. at 548. It should be pointed out that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) permits not only
federal Indian employment preference, but also preference within the private sector as well, where
no unique relationship exists between employer and Indian employee.
154. Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110, 1115 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870
(1979).
155. See notes 46, 52 supra and accompanying text.
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Two arguments exist for upholding Indian employment preference

ordinances in face of an equal protection challenge. It can be argued
that the preference statute is benign or remedial and that it should be
reviewed under a lesser standard than strict scrutiny, but under a stan-

dard more exacting than the rational basis standard. 156 In the alternative, it can be argued that despite the applicability of strict scrutiny,

there are "compelling government interests" which permit preference
ordinances. 157
b.

The Due Process Clause of the Indian Civil Rights Act

The due process clause contained in the ICRA is the only other
provision which could be used to limit the sovereign powers of a

tribe. ' 8 There has, however, been little litigation involving that provision. Its meaning and parameters will probably prove to be similar to
those of the United States Constitution's due process provisions, taking

into consideration the unique historical, governmental, and cultural at59
tributes of Indian tribes.
Procedural due process under the ICRA requires that minimal
protections, such as notice and opportunity to be heard, be afforded to
those individuals affected by acts of the sovereign which impinge upon

156. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978). Justice Brennan stated that
"a number of considerations-developed in gender-discrimination cases but which carry even
more force when applied to racial classifications-lead us to conclude that racial classifications
designed to further remedial purposes 'must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.'" Id. at 359.
157. See generally Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d at 1115-16 (finding a compelling state interest); Doores v. McNamara, 476 F. Supp. 987, 994-95 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (finding that the Kansas
City Board of Police Commissioners' affirmative action program satisfied compelling governmental interests). It should also be noted that in addition to the aspects of the ICRA equal protection
clause discussed in the text, the clause requires that tribes apply law in an equal manner and not
arbitrarily, treating all who are similarly situated alike. Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of
Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507 F.2d 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 1975); Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians, Inc. 506 F.2d 1231, 1237 (4th Cir. 1974); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 705 (8th
Cir. 1973); Two Hawk v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 404 F. Supp. 1327, 1334-35 (D.S.D. 1975).
158. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1976).
159. Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 n.5 (9th Cir. 1976); McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d
653, 655 (10th Cir. 1974); Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143, 1150-51, 1153-55 (D.S.D. 1974),
remandedon othergrounds, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975) (ICRA claims must not be measured by
the Bill of Rights). But see Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361,364 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Although due
regard for the historical, governmental, and cultural values of the Indian tribes has resulted in
some variance in the protections accorded under the Bill of Rights and the Indian Civil Rights Act
. . . our court has written that the due process clauses of both documents have the same meaning." Id. at 364 (citation omitted)). See also Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484
F.2d 200, 202-03 n.4 (9th Cir. 1973); Stands Over Bull v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 442 F. Supp.
360, 364 (D. Mont. 1977); Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370, 374 (D.N.M. 1971).
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constitutionally or statutorily 160 protected rights of liberty or property.16 ' This means that tribal employment preference ordinances will
a hearing prior to
most likely provide for notice of noncompliance and
62
the commencement of enforcement proceedings.'
During the early part of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
held that the due process clause of the Constitution imposed limits on
government action, above and beyond ordinary procedural requirements.163 This holding reflected strong underpinnings of natural law
and economic theory prevalent in that era.1 64 The Court has, however,
retreated from these substantive due process requirements in the sphere
of economic regulation,' 65 and has reduced the number of rights considered fundamental under due process analysis.' 66 At a minimum,
"[d]ue process requires governmental entities to utilize reasonable
means in seeking to achieve legitimate ends."' 167 Due process also demands that a tribal government obey the mandates of its tribal consti169
tution and ordinances. 68 As was noted in Solomon v. LaRose:
"Due process is more than requiring that a government's decision be
based upon a rational evidentiary basis and that certain concomitants
160. The term "constitutionally" refers to tribal constitutions since the federal constitution
does not apply to tribal governments. E.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959). The term "statutorily" refers
to tribal statutes and ordinances as well as the ICRA and applicable federal statutes.
161. See generally Mathews v. Elilridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). For cases involving the ICRA see Stands Over Bull v.
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 442 F. Supp. 360 (D. Mont. 1977); Berry v. Arapahoe & Shoshone
Tribes, 420 F. Supp. 934 (D. Wyo. 1976); Indian Political Action Comm. v. Tribal Executive
Comm. of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 416 F. Supp. 655 (D. Minn. 1976); Cowan v. Rosebud
Sioux Tribe, 404 F. Supp. 1338 (D.S.D. 1975); Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974),
remandedon othergrounds, 521 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1975). See note 114 supranoting that the due
process clause of the ICRA does not include life as a protected interest as do the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution. This seems to result from the fact that 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(7) (1976), which prohibits excessive bail or fines, and cruel and unusual punishments, sets
an absolute limit on punishment by tribal governments of six months' imprisonment and a $500
fine.
162. See D. Press, supra note 28, app. A, at 4-11.
163. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
164. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
165. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937).
166. See note 42 supra.
167. Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 26, 31 (D. Ariz. 1969). See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425
U.S. 238, 248-49 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
168. Olney Runs After v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 437 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (D.S.D. 1977);
Williams v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Council, 387 F. Supp. 1194, 1199 (D.S.D. 1975);
Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715, 723 (D. Neb. 1971).
169. 335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb. 1971).
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of procedural safeguards be observed, but entail the overriding notion
that government 'must
operate within the bounds of the instrument
70
which created it.'
3.

Express Congressional Limitations
As noted above, Congress has expressly exempted Indian employ-

ment preference from the prohibitions against racial discrimination in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17' Thus, Title VII does not
limit inherent tribal sovereignty, 7 2 but indicates an opposite congres73
sional intent.'
C. Extent of TribalAuthority

1. Entities and Persons Subject to Tribal Authority
Clearly, both Indian and non-Indian employers are subject to tri-

bal civil regulatory jurisdiction 174 and tribal employment preference
ordinances asserting such jurisdiction. 7

The fact that such an Indian

or non-Indian employer owns property in fee will not affect this power
as long as the land is within the boundaries of the reservation.

76

This

170. Id. at 723.
171. See notes 24-26, 36-37, 152-53 supra and accompanying text.
172. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 146 (Univ. N.M. ed. 1971).
173. See notes 36-37, 152-53 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 58-94 supra and accompanying text. This conclusion will apply even in a state
in which Congress has permitted some judicial authority over Indians to be exercised by the state
pursuant to the civil jurisdiction provisions 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976), supersededin part by 25
U.S.C. §§ 1322-1326 (1976). These provisions have been limited to private civil actions and
deemed not applicable to civil regulatory jurisdiction on reservations. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426
U.S. 373 (1976); United States v. New Mexico, 590 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1978); Santa Rosa Band of
Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1975).
175. Having the jurisdiction to regulate the conduct of both Indians and non-Indians does not
mean that a tribe must exercise it. Thus, a tribe can exclude application of its ordinances as to
certain groups if it so desires, subject to the limitations of the ICRA. See notes 109-70 supra and
accompanying text.
176. As a guide to the extent of a tribal territorial jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976) is
helpful. Section 1151 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian
country", as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b)
all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have
not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
Id. While expressly applicable to federal criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has said that
§ 1151 "generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction." DeCoteau v. District County
Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975). See also Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425
U.S. 463, 477-78 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1973);
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was the conclusion reached in Buster v. Wright,177 when the Eighth Circuit stated:
Neither the United States, nor a State, nor any other sover-

eign loses the power to govern the people within its borders by
the existence of towns and cities therein endowed with the

usual powers of municipalities, nor by the ownership or occuwithin its territorial jurisdiction by citizens
pancy of the 1land
78
or foreigners.

Some tribes have passed ordinances which purport to regulate federal and state businesses operating on the reservation. 179 Others ex-

pressly exempt government agencies from regulation but still require
agency contractors and subcontractors to comply, 180 perhaps recognizKennedy v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423, 424 n.1 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-23
nn.5, 6, & 10 (1959); Collins, supra note 58, at 528 nn.292-97. The term "Indian country" as used
in § 1151 has been regarded as expansive in its scope, United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649
n.18 (1978); Clinton, CriminalJurisdictionover Indian lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional
Maze, 18 ARiz. L. REv. 503, 507-13 (1976), and applicable to tribal as well as federal jurisdiction.
See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.l (1975); United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544 (1975); Collins, supra note 58, at 528.
Under the definition in § 115 1, "Indian country" includes all land within the exterior boundary of an Indian reservation "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent." 18 U.S.C. § 115 1(a).
This is true whether or not the patent was issued to non-Indians. Eg., United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544, 547 (1975); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351,
357-59 (1962); Beardslee v. United States, 541 F.2d 705, 707 (8th Cir. 1976). Only Congress can
remove land from a reservation, e.g., DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444
(1975); United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278,285 (1909), and even then the congressional intent
to disestablish the reservation must be specific and will not be easily construed by the courts.
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S.
425 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). The opening of Indian reservations to white settlement under the
General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 6, 24 Stat. 390 (1887) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349
(1976)), is not sufficient. Eg., Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 477-79 (1976).
It should be noted that tribal jurisdiction extends beyond the boundaries of the reservation
where allotments held by individual members of the tribe are involved. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c)
(1976); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 429 n.3 (1975).
177. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appealdismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906).
178. 135 F. at 952; Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 35759 (1962); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956). Cf., United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 455 (1975) (involving a congressionally delegated power). See McCoy, supra
note 79, at 418 nn.269-72. See also note 81 supra and accompanying text.
179. Crow Tribal Employment Rights Office, Ordinance No. 79-27 (Apr. 14, 1979): "2. All
employers, including but not limited to State, Federal, Crow Tribal, and private businesses, operating within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Reservation are hereby required to give preference to the greatest extent feasible to members of the Crow Tribe, first, and to Indians in general,
second." Id. While the Crow Ordinance imposes an "employment rights fee" on "covered employers" with 20 or more employees or gross sales in excess of $100,000, id. at 7, it expressly
excludes "educational, health, governmental, or non-profit employers." Id. at %7(b).
180. Colville Employment Rights Ordinance Res. No. 1978-557 (July 31, 1978) § 2.6:
Employer. The term "employer" shall mean any person, company, contractor, subcontractor, or other entity located or engaged in work on the Reservation, employing five
or more persons. The term "employer" excludes Federal, State, and County Govern-
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ing that an Indian tribe would not be able to require the federal government to comply with the tribe's preference ordinance. In most
instances, the power to exert such authority over the federal government and its employees is expressly taken from the tribes by treaty.""'
Even when the tribe has not relinquished this power by treaty, the purported tribal power over the operations of the federal government
probably will be deemed as one of "those powers 'inconsistent with their
statuS.' "182
The problems of mandating preference requirements in state governmental activities on Indian reservations are more difficult. There
has been no express withdrawal of this tribal power except in instances
where state governments are found to be agents of the federal govern84
ment.1 83 The implicit limits of tribal authority outlined in Oihant1
and Wheeler 85 are inapplicable because they involve only confficts between the federal government and a tribe. 86 In spite of such doctrinal
limits, at least one commentator has noted that such a provision
"would be inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribe."'' 87 This
ment agencies but includes Tribal and other agencies, contractors, and subcontractors of
all other agencies.
Id.
181. See note 103 supra. In reserving the tribe's right to exclude persons from their territory
and to condition their entry, the treaties generally except "such officers, soldiers, agents, and employes of the government, or of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties imposed by law, or the orders of the President. . . ." Treaty with the
Navajo Indians, June 1, 1868, United States-Navajo Indians, art. 2, 15 Stat. 667, 668 (1869).
182. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). See also note 71 supra.
This seems to be a situation within the presently undetermined scope of this limitation on tribal
powers. See notes 72-73, 108 supra and accompanying text. See also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache
Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980).
[Tmhe formulation seems to be merely descriptive of the conclusion that in certain
circumstances powers were not retained. . . .The critical factor in the cases is whether
important interests of the United States, other than Congress' basic interest in regulating
the affairs of the Indians, conflict with assertions of tribal authority.
Id. at 542. See also Salt River Project Agri. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Navajo Tribe of
Indians, No. Civ. 78-352 Phx WPC (D. Ariz. September 7, 1978) reported in 6 Indian L. Rep. F-4.
The court held that the Navajo Tribe, like states, could not impose certain taxes the legal incidence of which falls on the federal government. "The rationale for preventing states from taxing
the federal government in M'Culloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. (4 Wheat). 316 (1819), applies equally
well to taxation by Indian tribes." Id. at
183. See note 181 supra and accompanying text. This result seems unlikely since it is doubtful
that the Indians could be found to have understood that state governments were to be considered
as "agents" of the federal government. Such a finding would be necessary under the well established principles of treaty interpretation. E.g., Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
675-76 (1979).
184. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
185. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
186. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980) quoted in notes 71,
182 supra.
187. Fredericks, supra note 91, at 4.
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reasoning, however, is not persuasive. 8 If a state agency, or any contractor or subcontractor of an agency, was engaged in business on the
188. Id. Fredericks reasoned:
Under Section 2.6 the [Colville Employment Rights] ordinance also purports to regulate
state and county governmental agencies. As the United States Supreme Court made
clear in Morris[v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904)] the power of an Indian tribe to regulate the activity of non-Indians derives from the tribe's power to exclude non-Indians
from the reservation. Under the Enabling Act permitting Washington to become a state,
however, Washington has the right to exercise its civil and criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians on the reservation in regard to activities not directly affecting Indians or
their property. Draperv. UnitedStates, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); Utah & N. Ry. . Fisher,116
U.S. 28, 31 (1885). Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
the state also has an obligation to provide governmental services on an equitable basis to
all citizens of the state-including those living on the Colville Reservation. Tribal authority to place conditions on the presence of state employees on the reservation while
they are performing traditional governmental functions would be inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribe.
Id. at 3-4. This analysis is inadequate for several reasons. First, as made clear above, the power
to exclude non-Indians is not the only source of tribal power to regulate the activities of nonIndians on the reservation. See notes 58-94 supra and accompanying text. It is not the broadest
either. See note 100 supra. And even under the power to exclude it is not clear that the restriction
imposed by this requirement is outside the scope of tribal power. See 1 Op. ATr'y GEN. 465
(1829) quoted from 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REvIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, 156
(1977).
The statement that the State of "Washington has the right to exercise its civil and criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation...," is not supported to the extent represented
by the cases cited. Draperdealt solely withfederal criminaljurisdictionin a limited situation and
did not purport "to deny the federal government the ability to exercise whatever jurisdiction may
be necessary to effectuate its obligations to Indians ..
" D. GETCHEs, D. ROSENFELT, & C.
WILKINSON, Cases and Materials on FederalIndian Law 369 (1979) (emphasis added). While
tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians has been drastically limited, Oliphant v. Suquamish
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), this does not mean there is also a lack of tribal civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians. See notes 76-94 supra and accompanying text.
Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885), was cited by the Supreme Court in Williams v.
Lee, 358 U.S. 218 (1959), where the Court established the "infringement test" as the test governing
conflicts between tribes and states over jurisdictional issues. In this regard the Court stated that,
"absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." Id. at
220 (citation omitted). Later cases emphasized the existence of "governing Acts of Congress."
E.g., McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comn'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren Trading Post Co. v.
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). These cases developed the notion of federal "preemption" of state law in Indian affairs first espoused by Chief Justice John Marshall in Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). There are limits to what state actions the Court will consider
"preempted" by federal law. Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). See generally
D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, & C. WILKINSON, Casesand Materialson FederalIndian Law 29599 (1979). The Court is currently considering the issue of whether tribal action, as opposed to
federal action, is sufficient to preempt state jurisdiction. Confederated Tribes v. Washington, 48
U.S.L.W. 4668 (1980). The district court held that a tribal tax on cigarette sales to non-Indians on
the reservation preempted the state's tax. 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978). Therefore, the
questions of whether employment rights ordinances preempt state jurisdiction, and whether refusal by state agencies to comply "infringes" upon tribal self-goverment, requires more than
looking to see whether or not the activities directly affect Indians or their property, as suggested by
Fredericks. Draperand Fisherare also inapposite to the tribal rights ordinance situation because
there was absolutely no impact on Indians or their property in both of those cases as there would
be here. Draper involved a crime by a non-Indian against a non-Indian which, although occurring on a reservation, violated no tribal law and injured no tribal property. Fisher involved state
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reservation, such an agency would have to comply with valid tribal regulations in the same manner as any other business.1 89 Only if the state
agency was providing traditional government services on the reservation, where no similar services were performed by the tribal government, 190 would the employment preference be inapplicable.
Another area of potential conflict arises when tribes require contractors and subcontractors' 9 ' to give preference to enrolled tribal members, and not to Indians in general. 192 The trouble stems from federal
regulations' 93 which require that Indian laws "shall not. . . discriminate among Indians on the basis of. . .tribal affiliation."'' 94 On the
one hand, if a tribe limits preference to its members, federal contractors
may not be able to comply, since federal regulations prohibit employment discrimination among Indians on the basis of tribal affiliation. 95
taxation of a non-Indian railway which, although passing over the reservation, was not taxed or in
any other manner regulated by tribal law.
While the fourteenth amendment does impose the obligation upon the states to provide governmental services, this is not an absolute right. White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978)
(state had no duty to provide mental health care for indigent Indians living on a reservation, such
care is the responsibility of the United States); Thompson v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212
(N.D.N.Y. 1980) (a claim by residents of the Oneida reservation against the state, county, and city
governments for withdrawing police and fire protection from the Oneida Indian Reservation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) could not proceed against the state because it was not a "person"
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986 (1976)).
As noted above, the implicit limitation upon tribal authority developed in 010hant involves
only conflicts between the federal government and tribes. See note 186 supraand accompanying
text. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), is totally inapposite to the relationship between tribe and state because it dealt with the relationship between the state and federal
governments. As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated, Indian tribes do not derive their
power from the federal government. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). Indian tribes
are not federal instrumentalities. Eg., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
189. Eg., Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 123 (1829): When a state "becomes a
itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that
partner in a trading company, it devests [gic]
company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen." Id. at 124 (quoting 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907). See Salt River Project Agri. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Navajo
Tribe of Indians, No. Civ. 78-352 Phx. WPC (D. Ariz. September 7, 1978) reported in 7 Ind. L.
Rep. F-4.
190. If the tribe were offering adequate governmental service to residents of the reservation
any attempt by the state to do so would infringe upon the tribe's self-government. E.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
191. See notes 179-80 supra.
192. See Crow Tribal Employment Rights Office, Ordinance No. 79-27 (April 14, 1979).
193. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(6) (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 62,510 (Oct. 31, 1979) (to be codified in 41
C.F.R. §§ 14-1.354, -7.5002 to .5003).
194. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.5(a)(6) (1979). See also 44 Fed. Reg. 62,510, 62,514 (Oct. 31, 1979) (to
be codified in 41 C.F.R. § 14-7.5002(a)): "The Contractor agrees to give preference to Indians. . .regardless of. . .tribal affiliation for training and employment opportunities under this
contract. . . ." 44 Fed. Reg. 62,510, 62,514 (1979).
195. See note 194 supra.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol15/iss4/4

34

1980]

Andrson: Indian Employment Preference: Legal Foundations and Limitations
INDIAN EMPLOYMENT PREFERENCE

Conversely, if a tribal ordinance demands that preference be given to
Indians in general, that classification would have to be defended
against equal protection and due process challenges.1 96 The tribal interests addressed above,1 97 may be sufficient to withstand such challenges, especially on a reservation with large populations of members
from other tribes.
2.

The Problem of Timing

There would be no problem in applying a tribal preference ordinance to existing as well as future employers, provided existing employers were adequately notified of the new requirements.1 98 Most
ordinances only require compliance in the hiring of new employees, so
that existing employees would not lose jobs.' 9 9 The tribe could selectively enforce its ordinance at first, permitting the administering agency
to phase in the requirements of the ordinance. 2 o The substantive determination of which employers are subject to the ordinance must have
a rational basis and be equitably applied.2or
3.

Geographical Limitations in Applicability

As mentioned previously, tribal authority extends over all reservation lands, even if owned in fee by a non-Indian. 202 A problem may
arise when the tribe requires employers 0 3 to give employment preference to Indians not only at facilities located on the reservation, but also
at tribal facilities located near the reservation. 2 4 Although a tribe
196. See notes 106-70 supra and accompanying text.
197. See notes 131-32, 143-46, 157 supra and accompanying text.

198. The requirement of notice is mandated by the ICRA due process clause. 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(8) (1976). See notes 161-62 supra and accompanying text.
199. Colo. River Indian Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. 32 Draft Guidelines 3
(a) (Sept. 8, 1979); Spokane Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance, Res. No. 1979-218 § 10 (July
31, 1979). See notes 46, 52, 155 supra and accompanying text.
200. E.g., Seminole Tribal Employment Rights Ordinances No. C-109-80, 4(h) (Jan. 11,
1980):
In implementing these components, the [Tribal Employment Rights Office] shall have
the discretion to begin by implementing certain of these components or by applying all
of the components to limited kinds of employers (e.g., construction, mining). Whichever
approach to phasing in the program the TERO decides to use, it shall develop at a gradual pace in order to insure a stable and effective program.
Id.

201. See notes 138-42, 147-51, 157, 167-70 supra and accompanying text.
202. See notes 176-78 supra and accompanying text.
203. All employers on a reservation are not necessarily covered by the employment rights
ordinances.
204. E.g., Colo. River Indian Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. 32 Draft Guidelines
1 (Sept. 8, 1979): "If an employer is engaged in work on the Reservation, these Guidelines shall
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could not enforce such a provision against a non-complying employer's

off-reservation facilities, it would be able to impose available sanctions
against that employer's reservation facilities. 20 5 Another consideratoin

involves the possibility that a tribe and the employer could enter into a
contract which requires the employment preference. The employer, for
example, might need certain rights of way or leases from the tribe.20 6
Whether such a provision could be enforced though, would depend on
the defenses available under contract law.
4.

Enforcement
In Olphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,2 °7 the United States

Supreme Court drastically limited the power of Indian tribes to maintain law and order on their reservations by holding that tribes may not
also apply to any other facilities of the employer that are located within a reasonable commuting
distance from the reservation." Id. The definition of "near" comes from federal regulations. See
44 Fed. Reg. 62,510, 62,513, 62, 515 (to be codified in 41 C.F.R. §§ 14-1.354(c)(6), 147.5003(b)(3)).
205. This is not an extension of tribal sovereignty off the reservation. The tribe is exercising
no power as a sovereign outside the boundaries of the reservation (not including off-reservation
lands over which tribal authority is recognized). See 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c) (1976). See also note
189 supra.
Tribal action against an on-reservation facility for violation of tribal ordinances off-reservation must have a sufficient basis to pass review under the ICRA. In this regard it should be noted
that the Indian employment rights situation is unique. Congress has given its blessing to Indian
preference to the extent sought to be enforced, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i), and no state may proscribe
such a preference without violating Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), 2000e(b) (1976). See also
note 49 supra. But see Fredericks, supra note 91, at 3, stating, with regard to a similar provision in
the Colville Employment Rights Ordinance, Resolution No. 1977-842, that the ordinance
purports to authorize the Colville Employment Rights Commission to forbid a covered
employer from hiring an employee to work at an off-reservation site within commuting
distance of the reservation in violation of order of the Commission even though the
employee has no contact with the reservation and the employment complies in all respects with applicable state and federal law. Action by the tribe to deprive an employer
and employee of the right to enter into a contract of employment that is legal in the
jurisdiction where it is made and carried out would violate the due process rights under
the Indian Civil Rights Act of both the employer and the employee. The right to do
business within the borders of the reservation may not be conditioned on abstention
from entering into such contracts. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Miller
Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 349 (1953).
Fredericks, supra note 91, at 3. The reasoning in Fredericks is not persuasive. First, the fact that
the off-reservation employee has no contact with the reservation is not relevant. As noted above
the sanctions will be imposed upon the employer. Second, tribal action does not "deprive" an
employer and employee of the right to enter into a contract. The tribe seeks to dissuade noncompliance with its ordinance. What the tribe does is "deprive" an on-reservation employer who
fails to comply at off-reservation facilities the advantages of locating his/her business on the reservation. Finally, it should be noted that Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), was based
upon a notion of substantive due process previously repudiated by the Supreme Court. See note
133 supra. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 349 (1953), dealt with state taxation of interstate
commerce and has no relevance to the situation here.
206. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
207. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 20 8 But the O1phant
holding is inapplicable to the tribal exercise of civil regulatory jurisdiction.20 9 The presumption against the validity of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is absent where civil jurisdiction is
involved. 210 In this connection, the enforcement of tribal regulatory
ordinances against non-Indians has been upheld since Oi#7hant.2 11
Although tribal employment preference ordinances do not assert
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for violation of their provisions,
they do impose sanctions for noncompliance. 21 2 Typically, these ordinances provide that violators may be fined or denied the privilege of
doing business upon the reservation. 2 13 Perhaps the most severe sanction is the immediate removal from the reservation of those employees
hired in violation of the ordinance.21 4 The removal is said to be "sum208. See notes 60-75 supra and accompanying text. Olphant discussed the issue in terms of
"non-Indians", not "nonmembers". 435 U.S. at 195. In United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313
(1978), the Court stated the OIfphant holding in terms of "nonmembers". 435 U.S. at 326.
Collins, supra note 58, states that "[b]ecause of this discrepancy between contemporaneous opinions. and because the OIphant defendants were in fact whites, the question of tribal criminal
jurisdiction over Indians who belong to other tribes was not determined by O1fphant. Prior authority indirectly supports jurisdiction over nonmember Indians." Id. at 479 n.5. See United
States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1171 n.14 (9th Cir. 1979) (expressly avoiding the issue).
209. See notes 76-94 supra and accompanying text; Collins, supranote 58, at 508-16; McCoy,
supra note 79, at 418-22. McCoy compares the tribal and federal interests which the Court analyzed in Oliphant relating to criminal jurisdiction with those interests in the civil enforcement
context and finds OIfphant to be distinguishable. He concludes:
In civil enforcement proceedings, the federal interest in protecting a defendant's rights
is weak in comparison to the tribal interest in enforcing civil regulatory laws on a reservation. The relative strength of these interests suggests that tribal courts should have
jurisdiction. Moreover, when a civil enforcement proceeding does present some conflict
with the defendant's rights, the Supreme Court has upheld proceedings which are primarily designed to compel obedience to laws and to punish further violations. When tribal
civil enforcement proceedings promote this interest, the courts should not hold that the
protectorate relation inherently deprives tribes of power to bring such proceedings
against non-members and their property interests.
Id. at 422 (footnote omitted).
210. See notes 76-94 supra and accompanying text.
211. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979). See Quechan Tribe of Indians
v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976); Collins, supra note 58.
212. Eg., Seminole Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. C-109-80, § 3 (Jan. 11, 1980).
213. Id.:
Any employer who fails to comply with the laws, rules, regulations, or guidelines on
employment rights of the Seminole Tribe or who fails to obtain the necessary agreements
from its signatory unions shall be subject to sanctions which shall include but are not
limited to: denial of the right to commence business on Seminole reservations, fines,
suspension of the employer's operation, termination of the employer's operation, denial
of the right to conduct any further business on Seminole reservations, payment of back
pay or other relief to correct any harm done to aggrieved Indians, and the summary
removal of employees hired in violation of the Seminole Tribe's employment rights policies.
Id.
214. Removal is a permissible sanction where there is a justifiable basis for such action in
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mary," but no employee will be removed until the noncomplying employer is given notice of noncompliance as well as an opportunity to
present evidence to disprove noncompliance. 215 An employer usually
216
has the right to appeal any decision made by the enforcing agency.
There are, of course, limits
imposed by the ICRA on what action an
2 17
Indian tribe may take.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The federal policy regarding American Indians reflects a history of
vacillating Congressional moods.21 8 Once again, it appears that after a
brief period favoring the expansion of Indian rights, 219 the mood of
Congress is changing.22°
This development should concern the tribal governments. The issues raised underscore only a few areas of potential conflict between
Indians and non-Indians, and will take on increasing importance. The
burden of resolving these issues is on the tribal courts. 221 Congress will
undoubtedly question the capacity of tribal courts to resolve such disputes when the decision is made whether to expand access to the federal courts inhibited by Martinez.222
The power of Indian tribes to exert civil regulatory jurisdiction
over Indians and non-Indians on reservation territory is a necessary
power. Effective and efficient government demands that there be authority to license and zone. The Supreme Court's revised formulation
of the limitations upon tribal sovereignty 223 must apply only to crimiterms of ICRA due process limitations. See notes 167-70 supra. Cf.Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp.
26 (D. Ariz. 1969).
215. E.g., Seminole Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance No. C-109-80, § 3 (Jan. 1I,1980):
Sanctions shall be imposed by the TERO Director, after allowing the employer an opportunity to
present evidence showing why it did not violate the requirements or why it should not be sanctioned. Id.
216. Id.: An employer shall have the right to appeal to the Tribal Council any decision by the
TERO Director that imposes sanctions on him. Id. With regard to the issue of whether the Tribal
Council or the Tribal Courts should be the final arbitors see D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, & C.
WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 332-34 (1979).
217. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1979), Quechan Tribe of Indians
v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976).
218. Seegenerall)D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 29-119; S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY (1973).
219. D. GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT, & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL

INDIAN LAW 106-18 (1979).
220. Id. at 118-19 referring to what has been called the "backlash" against Indian rights.
221. See notes 115-21 supra and accompanying text.
222. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly put the burden on Congress to determine whether the tribes properly apply the ICRA.
223. CompareF. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123, quoted in note 58, supra,
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nal jurisdiction. The federal courts have appeared to follow this approach.2 2 4 Indian tribes will encounter many problems and much
resistance in enacting Indian employment preference ordinances, but
the need for such legislation is great. Many problems on the reservation, resulting from the increasing influx of non-Indians, can be alleviated.2 2 5 Such legislation may be the only means available to
independently improve the quality of life on reservations rather than
through federally imposed paternalistic legislation. Certainly, from a
historical perspective, governmental actions have substantially infringed on the lifestyle and resources of the American Indian. At this
juncture, there is an opportunity for government to develop, or at the
least not thwart, the potential which exists for the development of the
tribes' greatest asset-the human resource.
Kevin N. Anderson

with Oliphant v. Suquanish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978), quoted in the text at note 71,
supra,and United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), quoted in the text at note 59, supra.
224. E.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980); Wilson v. Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 459 F. Supp. 366 (D.N.D. 1978); see note 83 supra But see
Trans-Canada Enterprises Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, No. C-77-882M (W.D. Wash. July
27, 1798), 5 Ind. L. Rep. F-153, appealpending.
225. See generally 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 342-43
(1977).
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